2. While recovering in the intensive-care unit of a Parisian hospital from his failed suicide attempt in 1957, Leiris scribbled some notes from his bed. One of them reads: "Go back to La Règle du jeu aiming at turning it into a total objective work, on the model of Mallarmé's Livre or Duchamp's Mariée mise à nu." 3 Practically from the start, even before joining the Surrealist group, Leiris was a groupie of Rrose Sélavy, whose puns he copied out in his diary (September 12, 1925) . Via Robert Desnos, they are one of the major models for his own lyrical anagrams that start to appear in his diary from 1924 on and that he first collected under the title Glossaire, j'y serre mes gloses in La Révolution surréaliste in 1925.
When Leiris and Duchamp met, however, in December 1935, the context was quite different. Leiris, for one, was no longer a Surrealist. The middleman was Jean Paulhan, the editor of La Nouvelle revue française, in whose office the encounter occurred. It seems that the occasion was Raymond Roussel's Comment j'ai écrit certains de mes livres, which had just come out in November. Roussel had committed suicide in July 1933 and Leiris had somehow been instrumental in the material production of the posthumous book at Alphonse Lemerre, Roussel's one and only publisher, as well as in its promotion. Not only did he have some excerpts from the volume prepublished in the April issue of La Nouvelle revue française, for which he wrote an introduction ("Documents sur Raymond Roussel"), he was also going to review it for the same journal in January 1936. It is quite probable that the Rousselophiles or Rousselomaniacs of the time were fantasizing that Leiris, having known Roussel personally since his childhood, had more to say about Roussel than Roussel himself did, that he must have known even more about the Roussel mystery than the posthumous revelations of Comment j'ai écrit certains de mes livres disclosed. As for Duchamp, his early interest in Roussel was probably revived by the stunning disclosure that most of his narratives, and among them the cult novel Impressions d'Afrique (1910), had been generated from puns reminiscent of LHOOQ. In any case, Roussel was part of the conversation since Duchamp, in his first letter to Leiris, 3. Leiris's "imagination of the sign," to use Barthes's phrase, has a fundamentally phonographic bent. It is rooted not so much in the experience that a word doesn't mean as it sounds, but that a letter doesn't sound as it looks, exploring thus what could be called the audiovisual fault, i.e., the arbitrariness not of the sign as such (the relationship between words and things) but of the sound, the many ways sounds can become estranged from-and even within-the world of opticality, graphic or not. Hence Leiris's interest in Duchamp's rotoreliefs, which he describes as "records to look at and not to listen to," 9 records, in other words, whose sound is so to speak "hidden" by their look, as if they were painted over to the point of being silenced. In many regards, Leiris's treatment of the letter could remind one of Duchamp's famous rattle, "À bruit secret" (with hidden noise): it's not enough to look at it, you also have to shake it if you want to know how it sounds. As with a throw of dice, one doesn't know what sound is going to come out of the "cup" of the letter. Leiris's sensitivity to the written word goes against the grain of the traditional phonocentric utopia of a faithfully phonetic writing: far from dreaming of a writing that would support every curve of the phonetic wave, he emphasizes the audiovisual disjunction and does so by merely spelling out the letters: LHOOQ.
This willfully antiromantic shortsightedness also nourishes Leiris's often extravagant literalist bent, his systematic lowering or de-figuration of the metaphor, taken at its word, acted out according to its letter, his stubborn way of taking "seriously" what is just a figure of speech. It will, here again, find ample material in the short circuits of Duchamp's antiart objects: "Metaphor 'taken at the letter': a geometry book suspended by a thread ('geometry in space')," not to mention "the 'Paris air' ampule." 10 Barthes will call this antifigure "autonymy" (his example: "rat is a syllable"). It's the same literalism that also frames Leiris's perception of the Green Box, of the way it dodges a grave and slightly pompous aesthetic problem by giving it an arts-and-crafts solution, what he would call an "elegant solution" (substituting the relationship between container and content to that between form and content).
4.
No matter what the exact narrative of the encounter between the two might have been, there is something definitively enigmatic in thinking that Duchamp's Green Box played a major role in the genesis of Leiris's autobiographical endeavor and a lasting one since, as we saw, he still invoked it as a model as late as 1957. In December 1935, Leiris (who had just finished L'Age d'homme [Manhood] , his first autobiographical essay, in November) had no idea of the form his next project would take. In fact, he was busy completing his degree in anthropology and was not going to start La Règle du jeu until 1940. Moreover, it's only in 1945 that he will decide on this title. There was nevertheless a premonitory note, an inkling of the stakes around which La Règle du jeu would develop, namely the articulation of autobiography with the dialectic of games and rules, in the way his review of the Green Box emphasized the "valorization of the-gameas-living-thing over the-painting-as-dead-thing." In his practice, Leiris wrote, Duchamp demonstrates all the honesty of a gambler who knows that the game only has meaning to the extent that one scrupulously observes the rules from the very outset. What makes the game so compelling is not its final result or how well one performs, but rather the game in and of itself, the constant shifting around of pawns, the circulation of cards, everything that contributes to the fact that the game-as opposed to a work of art-never stands still.
Leiris, clearly, was more interested in the box than in the painting itself. This might be, to start with, because he hadn't seen The Large Glass itself (which never left America). 11 But also, more positively, and more importantly, because he was instantly sensitive to the mysteriously autobiographical dimension of Duchamp's device, to the way it articulated Duchamp's two major fields of experi- mentation, the readymade and the index, collapsing the difference between signature and seriality, performance and facsimile. 12 Duchamp's next step, writes Leiris presciently (foreshadowing Manzoni), should be "to place himself on exhibit after having signed himself, thus renewing on his own person those same procedures to which he submitted manufactured objects."
There is also the fact that, as a genre, autobiography is structurally condemned to incompleteness and that, conversely, incompleteness tends to induce an autobiographical effect. Duchamp's publication of the documents pertaining in various ways to the genesis of the Bride stamped as definitively unfinished the work he had left in New York in a state of arrested progress, the first Bride being thus forever interrupted by the second. In that sense, as Leiris notes, the Green Box performs the ultimate (definitively-and unfinishingly-unfinished) strip tease, "the true 'stripping bare'" ("la vraie 'mise à nu'"), both second and secondary, of its primary homonym, its remote referent, the glass painting.
Leiris's interest in Duchamp's box comes at a time when, having just completed the manuscript of L'Age d'homme, having also irreversibly decathected from the mirages of automatic writing, he was searching, in the aftermath of the revelation of Roussel's ars poetica, for a protocol that would ensure that the autobiographical self would never lose what Sartre called its transcendence, that the I would keep its linguistic status as an empty sign. The 1931-33 Dakar-Djibouti anthropological expedition had been for him an intensive training ground for the systematic technique of note-card filing. While in the process of becoming a professional ethnographer and of setting the stage for the dual exploration of autobiography and ethnography that will inform his further work for more than fifty years, this almost-manual (artisanal) aspect of his professional training will soon lead him to open a sort of autobiographical account, a kind of safe into which he will deposit entries cut out (i.e., copied out) from his diary, before drawing from this frequently reshuffled and augmented portfolio of memories, anecdotes, ideas, and feelings, small and big, to feed his continuous self-portrait. 13 The result is a secondary, indirect autobiography, originating not from the subject's innermost self, but from the stack of index cards (the autobiographical shards) in the little box on the author's desk. A self built on stilts, on "pilotis," relying not on direct, live memories (as in Proust's involuntary memory), but on archival documentation, on paper work, a self that relates to himself indirectly, by means of quotation, of self-compilation. the theme of the container in Mallarmé's poetics and his symbolist universe, specifically to the affinities and differences between the book, the casket, the safe, the chest or chest of drawers, and the coffin. 14 But there were for Leiris earlier associations of Mallarmé's work with more literal containers. In his preface to his 1925 first edition of Igitur, a text to which Leiris refers on a variety of occasions, Dr. Bonniot, the son-in-law of the poet, had written: "Mallarmé, as we know, used to jot down his first ideas, the first outlines of his work on eighths of half-sheets of school notebook size-notes he would keep in big wooden boxes of China tea." 15 Here the box, a coffin for the literary unborn, is thus associated with the definitively unfinished: it is the resting place for notes that didn't make it, didn't reach the stage of the book. The index card file, however, is not doomed to be tied to this funeral model. It is also the best support for the opera aperta, whose desire was pervasive in the 1950s and 1960s. Not unlike Duchamp's door that is both open and closed at the same time, the card file resists the syntagmatic closure of the sentence by sustaining the openness of the paradigm. It doesn't allow the phrase to gel, to take shape. A filing system is indefinitely expandable, rhizomatic (at any point of time or space, one can always insert a new card); in contradistinction with the sequential irreversibility of the pages of the notebook and of the book, its interior mobility allows for permanent reordering (for, even if there is no narrative conclusion of a diary, there is a last page of the notebook on which it is written: its pages are numbered, like days on a calendar).
6. According to Nathalie Léger, Barthes's practice of the index card goes back to his first reading of Michelet, in 1943, which is more or less also the time of his very first articles. The quotations and reflections he started to write down at the time on separate pieces of paper would become the bits around which he would later compose the Michelet par lui-même. As it is known, this volume was part of a book series whose editorial protocol (the title of the series, the standard presentation of the covers) was meant to flag a somehow self-contradictory message; it was a catchy way to indicate their two textual levels, combining anthology (par luimême) and monograph (by Roland Barthes). As it is also known, some twenty years later, Barthes was to return to this book series, as both author and subject, both author and title: Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes. This time, the index cards were already there. One of the pages of illustrations of the volume reproduces three of them in facsimile. The text doesn't comment on them, doesn't even allude to them. There is just a caption: "Reversal: of scholarly origin, the index card ends up following the twists and turns of the drive." It is hard not to be struck by the timing: as if the two were the flip side of each other, the emergence of the file card in Barthes's text is simultaneous with his deliberate use of the autobiographical first person, with his giving in to the autobiographical drive. Barthes's shift to autobiography came as a surprise for most of his readers and became an easy target for the irony of those who couldn't forgive him for having written "The Death of the Author." One can imagine that he was more or less innocently lured into it by Jakobson and Benveniste, whose example led him to believe that one could use the first-person pronoun without falling into the traps of what he denounces as the "illusion common to autobiographies," as if linguistics could perform a quasi-surgical clearing of the first person of any psychological mucus and substitute the semantic emptiness of the shifter (not dissimilar to the neutral emptiness of Robbe-Grillet's world) for the imaginary fullness of the person.
For interest in the shifter isn't in and of itself the symptom of a subject personally tempted by the first person. ( Jakobson didn't write an autobiography, nor did Benveniste.) Barthes, too, so it seems, entered the space of the first person as if he were free of any autobiographical afterthoughts, as if Jakobson's analyses of the shifter, as a counter-poison, or anti-venom, had immunized him against any risk of contamination by the subjectivity effect: using the first person, but out of the conviction that for a writer it has no use value. Thus he took the risk of talking about himself precisely because there was no risk of succeeding at it. He was ready to put himself on the line to demonstrate that, language embodying the paradox of the institutionalization of subjectivity, one always fails in speaking of oneself: the autobiographical drive is doomed to what J. L. Austin would call "infelicities."
A similar shift from mention to use, from theory to practice, from description to performance can be traced in relation to what Barthes will eventually identify as his formal fate, his signature form, the discontinuous-what he himself describes as a certain shortness of breath. Very early on, he fought for an aesthetics and an ethics of the discontinuous (which the structuralist activity of cutting and editing, the gestures of montage, the practice of analysis will epitomize) as a defense against the endoxal stickiness of continuity. He defended it in short texts; but that was not the point. The small dimension of his own output was never foregrounded, never thematized. There was no hint of a possible self-referential connotation, of the possibly pro domo dimension of such an adamant and eloquent discourse in favor of the discontinuous. Discontinuity, then, was on the side of the object, its concentration on the referent and the signified leaving no space for a feedback on the textual performance itself. At least not before the preface of Critical Essays, where Barthes identifies it as the formal feature of critical writing: "the very discontinuity which marks all critical discourse."
7. The theory of the shifter is a perfect defense against the psychological temptation to endow the subject with an ontological, translinguistic reality, to posit a subjective substance (psyche, soul, person) that would exist independent of its performance in speech acts. The focus of Barthes's first references to Jakobson's work, however, is not so much to the analyses of the shifter as such as to the way they allow Jakobson to explain why the first person and its cognates are both the last linguistic acquisition of the child and the first linguistic loss of the aphasiac.
Jakobson's first essays to be translated into French came out in 1963. Barthes refers to them, the very same year, in the preface to the Critical Essays where he identifies (if one may say so) both positively and negatively with those two invalid speaking subjects whom, for not having yet (or having no longer) access to the first person, he promotes as models or examples for the writer, granted one difference: the writer takes responsibility for not uttering the "I" that both the child and the aphasiac are constitutionally unable to use.
But there is another difference: as opposed to the child who is able to overcome this lack by using the third person to speak about himself (referring to himself by way of his first name or nickname), the aphasiac cannot make up for the loss of the first person, cannot compensate. Hence the two types of writers Barthes distinguishes: the novelist who, like the child, shifts to the third person and speaks of himself as other people do, and the critic who, like the aphasiac, does not have access to such a substitute and can use neither the first nor the third person. Why not? Because he cannot bring himself to convert his "I" into "the fragment of a code," to have his privacy, his intimacy reduced to a mere shifter. For the critic, says Barthes, wants to have it both ways, wanting (or wishing) to write but not wanting (or unable) to renounce the first person. Like the fetishist, he thinks: I know (I've read Jakobson), but nevertheless. . . . "The critic would be the man who cannot produce the 'he' of the novel, but who also cannot cast the 'I' into pure private life, i.e., renounce writing." "His 'I' is too heavy with time for him to be able to renounce it and to bestow it upon the integral code of others."
In 1964, in the pages of Elements of Semiology where Barthes summarizes Jakobson's work for the second time, the shifter is described as a reversal of the relationship between code and message; instead of the message being formatted by the code, as usually happens, it is the code that is being troubled, upset by the force of a message that tries to break in. Once it appeared in Barthes's text, the problematic of the shifter will never be very far from that of the index, i.e., from that of messages without a code, to quote the definition he gave early on of the photographic message. And it is not insignificant from this point of view that Barthes's self-portrait is also his first book to include photographic reproductions and that the second one, La Chambre claire, will be a phenomenological exploration of the interface between photography and autobiography. It is not insignificant either that among the illustrations of the Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes there are a series of facsimile reproductions of the author's handwriting, analogic reproductions of linguistic graphemes, pieces of writing silenced, abstracted from the universe of discourse by their photographic reproduction. In particular, as we have seen, the three index cards are reproduced not for the sake of their content, not for their signified, but for a reality-effect value for which our expanding taste, says Barthes, encompasses the fashion of diaries, of testimonials, of historical documents, and, most of all, the massive development of photogra-phy. In that sense, the reproduction of these three slips ironically resonates, if on a different scale, with the world tour of the mask of Tutankhamen. It refers, if not to the magic silence of a relic, at least to the ghostly parergonal quality of what French language calls a reliquat.
